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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Background:  In 2006  a major  healthcare  reform  was  introduced  in  the  Netherlands,  implying  managed
competition.  This  study  explored  the level  of consensus  on the  outcomes  and  desired  changes  of  this  new
system,  and  differences  between  stakeholder  groups.
Methods:  A three-round  Delphi-study  was conducted  among  Dutch  healthcare  insurers,  health
economists,  and professionals  in  general  practice  (GP)  care  and  mental  health  (MH) care.  In the first
round,  20  experts  indicated  the  most  important  advantages  and  disadvantages  of the  Dutch  managed
competition,  and  desired  changes.  Experts  in  the  second  (n  =  106)  and  third  round  (N  = 88)  rated  the
importance  of the  88  factors  identified  in  the first  round.
Results:  Only  healthcare  insurers  reached  consensus  on  important  advantages  (i.e.  improved  efficiency;
room  for  choice).  Health  economists  reached  almost  no  consensus  on any  factors.  GP and  MH-care  profes-
sionals  reached  most  consensus  on  disadvantages  (i.e.  focus  on price  over  quality,  increased  bureaucracy)
and desired  changes  (i.e.  reduce  bargaining  power  of healthcare  insurers;  increase  attention  for  care  of
complex  patients);  half  of them  suggested  abolishment  of  managed  competition.
Conclusion:  GP  and  MH-care  professionals  were  most  dissatisfied  and  suggested  several  changes  or  even
abolishment  of  the  2006  reform;  healthcare  insurers  mentioned  some  benefits.  This level  of  dissatisfaction
among  health  care  professionals  indicates  that  there  is room  for improvement,  preferably  developed  in
conjunction  with  stakeholders.









In the Netherlands, a major healthcare reform was introduced
in 2006. The traditional system no longer met  requirements for
access to affordable, necessary medical care of good quality for all
Dutch citizens in a sustainable manner on the long-term [1]. The
reform via the Health Insurance Act (HIA) implied integration of the
former statutory health insurance scheme (sickness fund scheme)
and private health insurance arrangements into a universal manda-
tory basic package scheme with competition between insurers and
freedom of choice for consumers [2–4]. The new system entails a
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ompulsory basic insurance for everyone including core healthcare
eimbursements for everyone, such as general practitioner care,
mergency care, specialist care, medicines and psychological care.
ealthcare insurers have to accept everyone for the basic package.
nsured persons can expand basic coverage with supplementary
nsurance policies. In the current system healthcare insurers com-
ete on price for this additional package.
The reform resulted in a central position for healthcare insurers
2], implying: a. healthcare insurers to compete and act as pru-
ent buyers of health care on behalf of their customers [5], and b.
anaged competition in which the insured, the healthcare insurers
nd the healthcare providers, became market players. This man-
ged competition, in which health care providers negotiate with
nsurance companies, aims to increase efficiency, reduce central
overnance and improve accessibility of health services of a good
uality at acceptable societal costs [3].
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The role of managed competition in healthcare is complex and
much debated [6–11], and there is no consensus on whether the
reforms reached their goals [9,12,13]. Opponents criticize its com-
plexity, the determining role of healthcare insurers in the client
– manufacturer relationship [6–13], the lack of transparency, and
the power conflict between insurers and care providers [2]. Dissat-
isfaction has increased especially among general practitioners and
professionals in mental healthcare as workload became increased
due to changes in mental health care, elderly care and youth care.
This led to demands for reducing bureaucracy and improving health
care insurers’ trust in healthcare professionals [14,15]. The Dutch
Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) concluded that compe-
tition in Dutch healthcare got out of hand and should be restricted
to guarantee high quality care [16]. A recent conclusion from a spe-
cial issue in Health Policy concluded that still much work needs
to be done [17], also to restore low institutional trust [18,19]. Low
levels of trust may  reduce support for the new health care sys-
tem among stakeholders [2]. It is therefore important to know
the perceived outcomes of the new health care system of profes-
sionals related to the fields of general practice and mental health
care to identify outcomes that they are satisfied with and which
not, whether these perceptions are the same for relevant groups
of stakeholders, and how to potentially address dissatisfaction in
order to increase levels of trust.
Consequently, the first aim of this study is to explore con-
sensus among experts on the most important outcomes, such as
advantages, disadvantages as well as potential changes needed to
optimize managed competition in the Dutch healthcare system by
exploring this among stakeholders relevant for these two  domains
of health care. The second aim is to identify similarities and dif-
ferences among these stakeholder groups in their opinion on the
most important advantages, disadvantages and desired changes to
optimize managed competition in Dutch healthcare. This identifi-
cation may  provide directions for optimizing the current system
to achieve and maintain the overall goals of the Dutch healthcare




A three-round online Delphi study [20] was conducted among
health economists, healthcare insurers, and professionals in the
general practice (GP) care and the mental health (MH) care to iden-
tify and prioritise advantages, disadvantages and desired changes
of managed competition in the Dutch healthcare system.
2.2. Participants and sampling
An expert was defined as an informed individual [21], a special-
ist in their field [22], and someone with knowledge about a specific
subject [23–25]. Dutch speaking professionals from health eco-
nomics, health care insurances, GP-care and MH-care were selected
as experts for this study. Within GP-care professionals, three types
of professions were included: [1] general practitioner [2]; GP nurse
specialized in chronic disease and elderly care, and [3] GP nurse
specialized in mental health. Experts in the group of the MH-care
professionals included psychiatrists, psychologists, psychothera-
pists, MH  nurse practitioners and social psychiatric nurses.
Initially we  approached the professional organisations for dis-
tribution of the questionnaire. As they did not respond to our
invitation we decided to use purposive sampling and snowball sam-
pling [26,27] to identify and select various different experts aiming
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tions, (health) professional groups and professionals groups were
dentified to be contacted for the first round with the aim to invite a
inimum of seven experts per group – a common standard within
elph studies. This resulted in a list of in a total of 21 experts. The
ost important selection criterion was  that the researcher was cur-
ently employed in the specific area of the particular profession of
he group [28]. These experts were sent an invitational e-mail. Par-
icipants in the first round were asked to suggest other experts
or the second and third round. Identification of experts by the
esearchers and participants resulted in a list of 339 eligible experts
ith the same inclusion criterion as for round 1. In each round, the
xperts were invited to respond to the questions in an online 15-
inute survey. All questionnaires were piloted by approximately
ve randomly chosen subjects – different from those recruited for
he main study – to verify clarity of questions.
.3. Data collection
Participants were informed about the purpose of the research,
he risks associated with the research, their obligations and conse-
uences of participation, and their right of withdrawing consent
uring data collection of the study. All participants were asked
o provide written informed consent for the study at the start of
he online questionnaire. Study approval was  given by the ethics
ommittee of the faculty of Health, Medicine and Lifesciences of
aastricht University (FHML/HPIM/2018.112).
.3.1. Delphi first round
The first-round survey consisted of two parts. The first part
ssessed gender, age, current profession and years of work expe-
ience. The second part involved open-ended questions [29]
ssessing [1]: ‘’What are the most important advantages of man-
ged competition in the Dutch healthcare system?” [2]; ‘’What are
he most important disadvantages of managed competition in the
utch healthcare system?”; and [3] ‘’What are the most desired
hanges regarding the current system of managed competition?”.
ll participants were asked to indicate a maximum of six answers
er question to facilitate manageability of responses.
A selection of 40 experts was invited for round 1. Two e-mail
eminders were sent to non-responders after two  and four weeks.
wo researchers analysed the raw data and merged similar factors
ia discussion. In case of ambiguities or disagreement between the
esearchers about a factor, a third researcher was  asked for his opin-
on. Factors for which full agreement among all three researchers
ere reached were included in the second-round questionnaire.
he wording used by participants – with minor editing – was  used
or the questions for round two.
.3.2. Delphi second round
In the second round, demographic characteristics (similar to
he first round) and the 88 unique factors were presented to 339
xperts in an online questionnaire. Participants were asked to rate
he importance of each factor on a seven-point Likert scale, rang-
ng from 1 (fully disagree) to 7 (fully agree). Participants were
lso asked to state whether and how managed competition could
e optimized. Opponents of continuation of managed competi-
ion in Dutch healthcare were asked to provide an alternative for
he current healthcare system. Email reminders were sent to non-
esponders after two  and four weeks, resulting in 106 respondents.
xperts rated all factors due to the forced response format of the
nline survey. Results of round two  were analysed per stakeholder
roup to identify group similarities and differences Factors with an
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2.3.3. Delphi third round
The third round’s purpose was to finalize ranking. All respon-
dents of the second round questionnaire (n = 106) were invited to
re-rate the remaining factors for which no consensus was reached
in the second round. This questionnaire differed per stakeholder
group as the survey contained controlled feedback of the group’s
response expressed in a median (Mdn) score, so that participants
had knowledge of the specific group whilst maintaining group
anonymity [30]. Email reminders were sent to non-responders after
two and four weeks. Experts rated all factors due to the forced
response format of the online survey. Results of the questionnaire
of Delphi round three were also analysed per stakeholder group.
2.4. Data analysis
The first round data was analysed using Qualtrics and con-
tent analysis by grouping similar items together [31]. Subsequent
rounds were analysed to identify convergence and change of par-
ticipants’ views. Descriptive and inferential statistics were used to
describe sociodemographic characteristics of participants and to
analyse the extent of consensus [31]. As suggested by the literature,
the level of agreement on each item and consensus was determined
using the median and interquartile range (IQR) after three rounds
of data collection and analysis [32]. Agreement was  assessed by the
median for each item; a factor with a Mdn  score of ≥6 was consid-
ered important [33]. Consensus was determined as the interquartile
range (IQR) being one or less. Similarity in consensus on important
factors between two or more groups existed when the Mdn  score
was ≥6 and the IQR was ≤1 for a single factor. Microsoft Office
Excel was used to calculate averages, standard deviations (SDs),
percentages, median (Mdn) scores and IQRs. The results concern-
ing the advantages, disadvantages and desired changes were used
to create appendixes 1–3.
3. Results
Twenty experts (50.0 % response rate) participated in the first
round, consisting of healthcare insurers (n = 5), health economists
(n = 4), MH-care professionals (n = 7), and GP-care professionals (n
= 4). In total, 88 unique factors were identified and used as input for
the second and third round surveys, consisting of advantages (21
factors), disadvantages (35 factors) and desired changes (32 fac-
tors). A total of 106 experts were included in the second round (31.3
% response rate). The third round questionnaire was  completed by
88 experts (83.0 % response rate). Sociodemographic characteris-
tics of the experts and response rates per stakeholder group are
presented in Table 1.
3.1. Health care insurers
Table 2 reveals that after three rounds healthcare insurers
reached consensus on nine advantages, for instance increased free-
dom of choice for the insured and improved quality of care. They
reached consensus on three disadvantages, for example uncer-
tainty about the final responsible stakeholder in certain healthcare
issues, and excessive bargaining power of hospitals compared
to healthcare insurers). Lastly, consensus was reached regarding
ten desired changes (i.e. increasing differences in reimbursement
between contracted and non-contracted care; reducing cherry
picking (i.e. providers who  mainly try to provide care to the most
profitable patients)).3.2. Health economists
Health economists reached consensus on two desired changes:
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osts and accessibility of care; increasing investments in preven-
ion and early detection. No consensus was reached on important
dvantages and disadvantages of managed competition in Dutch
ealthcare.
.3. Mental health care professionals
Mental health care professionals did not reach consensus on the
dvantages of the current health care system. They reached consen-
us on 17 disadvantages, for instance focus on price over quality of
are; excessive bargaining power of healthcare insurers compared
o care providers. Regarding the desired changes, consensus was
eached on 13 factors, such as increasing attention for care of com-
lex patients; and increasing the transparency of health insurance
olicies on quality, costs and accessibility of care (see Table 3).
.4. General practice care professionals
GP-care professionals did not reach consensus on advantages
f the current system. They reached consensus on seven disadvan-
ages, such as detrimental effects on care for the most complex
atients; and the focus on price over quality of care (see Table 4
or more information). Concerning the desired changes, consensus
as  reached on ten alterations, such as increasing uniformity in
ealthcare insurers’ requirements for care providers; and reducing
he bargaining power of healthcare insurers.
.5. Group similarities
GP and MH  professionals reached consensus on six i disadvan-
ages: [1] detrimental effects on care for the most complex patients
2]; focus on price over quality of care [3]; the loss of health care
oney as a result of competition among market players [4]; exces-
ive bargaining power of healthcare insurers compared to care
roviders; [5] increased complexity of the healthcare system; and
6] increased bureaucracy. Both groups reached consensus on six
mportant changes [1]: increasing attention for care of complex
atients [2]; increasing uniformity in healthcare insurers’ require-
ents for care providers [3]; reducing the bargaining power of
ealthcare insurers [4]; reducing administrative burden for care
roviders [5]; increasing input and control to health care pro-
essionals should regarding desired treatment pathways; and [6]
implifying healthcare regulations.
Healthcare insurers and GP-care professionals reached con-
ensus on one desired change: increasing transparency of care
rovided by healthcare professionals. Healthcare insurers and MH-
are professionals reached consensus on three desired changes:
1] reducing production incentives for care providers [2]; increas-
ng trust between care providers and healthcare insurers; and [3]
educing cherry-picking.
Health economists and professionals in the GP and MH-care
eached consensus on two important changes: [1] increasing the
ransparency of health insurance policies on quality, costs and
ccessibility of care and [2] increasing investments in prevention
nd early detection. Healthcare insurers and professionals in the GP
nd MH-care reached consensus on one change: a better compen-
ation of implementation of evidence-based innovations by care
roviders.
.6. Continuation of managed competition in Dutch healthcare
No consensus existed between the different stakeholder groups
bout continuation of managed competition. All health care insur-
rs (n = 8) and most health economists (n = 12) favoured
ontinuation of managed competition, with certain changes. One
id not want changes; one suggested full abolishment.
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Table  1
Sociodemographic characteristics study participants.
Sector Characteristic 1st round (n = 20) 2nd round (n = 106) 3rd round (n = 88)
Healthcare insurers
Number invited 7 12 8
Number participated (% response rate) 5 (71.4) 8 (66.7) 7 (87.5)
Work experience in yrs. (SD) 7.4 (1.0) 5.9 (3.0) 6.3 (3.0)
Age  in yrs. (SD) 52.4 (7.9) 48.9 (8.9) 48.7 (9.5)
Sex
Female (%) – – –
Male (%) 5 (100.0) 8 (100.0) 7 (100.0)
Health  economists
Number invited 10 49 14
Number participated (% response rate) 4 (40.0) 14 (28.6) 12 (85.7)
Work  experience in yrs. (SD) 23.5 (14.5) 14.5 (8.2) 13.4 (8.2)
Age  in yrs. (SD) 52.8 (11.8) 42.2 (9.0) 40.9 (8.7)
Sex
Female (%) – 3 (21.4) 2 (16.7)
Male  (%) 4 (100.0) 11 (78.6) 10 (83.3)
Mental  health care
professionals
Number invited 13 195 49
Number participated (% response rate) 7 (53.8) 49 (25.1) 41(83.7)
Work experience in yrs. (SD) 17.6 (8.7) 15.7 (11.1) 14.5 (10.4)
Age  in yrs. (SD) 47.7 (10.0) 50.9 (11.4) 50.5 (11.5)
Sex
Female (%) 3 (42.9) 25 (51.0) 19 (46.3)
Male  (%) 4 (57.1) 24 (49.0) 22 (53.7)
General practice care
professionals
Number invited 10 83 35
Number participated (% response rate) 4 (40.0) 35 (42.2) 28 (80.0)
Work  experience in yrs. (SD) 3.3 (2.3) 12.7 (9.8) 14.0 (10.1)
Age  in yrs. (SD) 32.8 (7.2) 46.5 (11.7) 46.8 (10.6)
Sex
Female (%) 3 (75.0) 24 (68.6) 19 (67.9)
Male  (%) 1 (25.0) 11 (31.4) 9 (32.1)
Table 2
Opinions of health care insurers.
Perceived Advantages Disadvantages Desired Changes
increased freedom of choice for
the insured
uncertainty about the final
responsible stakeholder in certain
healthcare issues
increase attention for healthcare outcomes
improved quality of care excessive bargaining power of
hospitals compared to healthcare
insurers and
improve the system of risk equalization
improved accessibility of care increased incentives for over
treating patients by care providers
increase differences in reimbursement between contracted and
non-contracted care
reduced waiting times for
patients
reduce production incentives for care providers
cost-containment reduce cherry picking (i.e. providers who mainly try to provide care to the
most profitable patients
improved efficiency of health
care
develop policies to protect health data of patients and the insured
increased innovation in
healthcare
increase transparency of care provided by healthcare professionals
a  better balance between
quality, accessibility and
affordability of care







system with managed competition, and identified notable findings.
First, only health care insurers reached consensus on important
advantages of managed competition in Dutch healthcare, per-increased awareness of
healthcare costs
Half of the MH-care professionals (n = 25; 51 %) agreed upon
abolishment of managed competition, whereas 24 (49.0 %) agreed
on continuation with changes. Of the GP-care professionals, 54 %
(n = 19) agreed on abolishment, while 46 % (n = 16) agreed on
continuation with changes.
Advocates of abolishing managed competition in the Dutch
healthcare system (n = 45) opted for different alternatives. Most
frequently suggested alternatives for the current system of man-
aged competition were a government controlled healthcare system
(n = 6), a population or regional based funding system (n = 5), the
return to the former sickness fund system (n = 3) and a single payer
system dubbed ‘national care fund’ (n = 2). t
30better compensate the implementation of evidence-based innovations by
care provider
increase regional responsibility of different stakeholders in care processes
. Discussion
Several overviews about the effects of the 2006 reform con-
luded that – despite benefits – the introduction of the Dutch Health
nsurance Act also resulted in problems and political controver-
ies [2,3,34–36]. We  conducted a Delphi study among experts to
dentify the level of consensus regarding the positive and negative
ffects and potential adaptations of the current Dutch health careaining to increased freedom of choice; improved accessibility
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Table  3
Opinions of mental healthcare professionals.
Disadvantages Desired Changes
focus on price over quality of care increase attention for care of complex patients
excessive bargaining power of healthcare insurers compared to care
providers
increase the transparency of health insurance policies on quality, costs
and accessibility of care
the  use of wrong healthcare procurement strategies by healthcare insurers reduce the bargaining power of healthcare insurers;
increased administrative burden for care providers reduce incentives for care providers
increased overhead costs as a result of regulation, care purchasing
processes and administration
reduce administrative burden for care providers
increased uncertainty and a lack of clarity among care providers as a result
of a lack of uniformity in the requirements of different healthcare
insurers
increase trust between care providers and healthcare insurers; and
a  poorly functioning Diagnosis Treatment Combination (DTC) payment
system
simplify healthcare regulations
increased complexity of the healthcare system increase investments in prevention and early detection
increased bureaucracy increase uniformity in healthcare insurers’ requirements for care
providers
excessive focus on control improve the DTC payment system
detrimental effects on care for the most complex patients give more input and control in desired treatment pathways to health
care professionals
inadequate time for care providers with their patients reduce cherry-picking
inadequate attention for prevention and early detection better compensate the implementation of evidence-based innovations
by care providers
increased healthcare costs
the loss of health care money as a result of competition among market
players
increased cherry-picking by care providers
increased mistrust between different market actors
Table 4
Opinions of general practice care professionals.
Disadvantages Desired Changes
detrimental effects on care for the most
complex patients
increase attention for care of complex patients
focus on price over quality of care increase the transparency of health insurance policies on quality, costs and accessibility of care
the  loss of health care money as a result of
competition among market players
increase investments in prevention and early detection
excessive bargaining power of healthcare
insurers compared to care providers
increase uniformity in healthcare insurers’ requirements for care providers
increased bureaucracy reduce the bargaining power of healthcare insurers
increased complexity of the healthcare system reduce administrative burden for care providers


























and quality of care; reduced waiting times for patients; aware-
ness of healthcare costs and cost-containment; improved efficiency
of health care; increased innovation in healthcare; and balance
between quality, accessibility and affordability of care. Several of
these advantages are related to the central role of healthcare insur-
ers in orchestrating the current Dutch healthcare [2], where health
care insurers compete and act as prudent buyers of health care on
behalf of their customers [5]. Yet, health economists did not reached
consensus on important cost and efficiency advantages. Reports on
cost reduction, increased efficiency and quality appear to be mixed
and also depend per context and problem addressed [37–39]. A
further in-depth study about these topics with this subgroup is
therefore warranted to obtain a more detailed picture.
Second, GP-care professionals and MH-care professionals
reached consensus on various disadvantages and desired changes
regarding managed competition in Dutch healthcare. Just over
half of them wants abolishment of managed competition in Dutch
healthcare. Of the stakeholders involved in this study, GP and
MH-care professionals were most dissatisfied about managed com-
petition, which is also reflected by their initiatives to reduce
bureaucracy and administrative burden, and improving health care
insurers’ trust in healthcare professionals [14,15], and vice versa as




31sate the implementation of evidence-based innovations by care providers
ansparency of care provided by healthcare professionals
care regulations
Third, three desired changes were mentioned most often. The
rst concerned increasing the transparency of health insurance
olicies on quality, costs, and accessibility of care. Failing clear
nd timely information of insurers to their customers and a low
ealth insurance literacy of customers tends to decrease trust in
ealthcare insurers [40] calling for increased transparency about
rocedures and quality [4,19]. Although transparency of insurers’
nformation to its clients has increased, information about waiting
imes and traceability of information still needs further improve-
ent [41]. The second change concerned increasing investments in
revention and early detection, which may  foster quality of life and
educe care demands on the long run, thus increasing affordability
nd accessibility of healthcare [41], although evidence on its cost-
ffectiveness is contradicting [42,43]. These recommendations are
lso in line with recent actions by Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare
nd Sport, such as incorporating lifestyle interventions in the basic
nsurance package [41] and promoting longer independent home
iving for the elderly [44]. The third desired change concerned com-
ensation of evidence-based innovations by care providers. While
ealthcare insurers negotiate with providers about price, quantity
nd quality of care [4], evidence shows that quality only played
 limited role in negotiations between insurers and providers [4],
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a good price compensation for the implementation of high quality
evidence-based innovations in health care.
Fourth, whereas healthcare insurers regarded their bargain-
ing power as an advantage, MH-care and GP-care professionals
regarded this as a disadvantage. Although ideally balanced nego-
tiations require comparable power positions between parties [45],
the current relationship between insurers and care providers has
resulted in much power for the insurers, findings also reported by
other studies [2] (36). This also resulted in protests by general prac-
titioners (GPs) and MH-care professionals concerning, bureaucracy,
(too low) tariffs, complex contract conditions [46], and uncon-
tracted MH-care providers [47].
Our study is subject to limitations. First, snowball sampling
and purposive sampling may  have introduced selection bias [48].
Snowball sampling leaves it to the respondent to indicate rele-
vant experts, which may  result in biases. Additionally, respondents
dissatisfied with the current health care system may  have been
more likely to participate. The absence concerning consensus about
the advantages among professionals from the general practice and
mental health could reflect such a bias. Hence, study replication
using other sampling techniques is recommended. Second, our
sample contained only seven healthcare insurers, which is regarded
as sufficient [28] although others include 10–15 experts [49] yield-
ing no clear consensus on the optimal number of participants in a
Delphi study [50]. Third, the 30 % response rate for round 2 was
modest, but high (81 %) in round 3. Our response rates are simi-
lar to many Delph studies where approximately 30 % take part in
the second round, and 70 % in the subsequent round [51]. Fourth,
personal perspectives may  have played a role in the identification
of advantages, disadvantages and changes needed. The phrasing of
the questions allowed participants to report on perceived advan-
tages and disadvantages, which could also imply pros and cons for
them personally. Yet, this bias is possible for all stakeholders and it
is difficult to conclude whether self-interests were more leading in
one group that in another. By choosing open wording to cover all
angles of interest in round 1 we aimed to cover a broad spectrum of
answers, and also resulting in a wide variety of topics mentionned
by the participants.
Fifth, due to feasibility reasons, our study focused on the per-
ceptions among Dutch healthcare insurers, health economists, and
professionals in general practice (GP) care and mental health (MH)
care, also to increase understanding and dissatisfaction and distrust
among general practitioners and mental healthcare profession-
als. Future studies are encouraged to address perceived outcomes
of the current health care system among citizens, patients, other
groups of care providers such as hospitals and independent treat-
ment centers, municipalities and politicians regarding the role of
managed competition in Dutch healthcare. Sixth, our study used a
bottom-up approach to assess stakeholder perspectives and thus
did not use already identified criteria for efficient and affordable
regulated competition in health care [11]. Finally, after the 2006-
reform other health policy decisions were taken in the Netherlands
(e.g. social support act, mental care reform, long-term care reform,
youth care reform (see for instance [52]), that could have influenced
the responses of the participants.
5. Conclusions
Views of the various groups differed significantly, which is
also understandable given the different roles that the profession-
als have. For instance, health insurers and health economists may
be more focusing on an overall perspective, whereas profession-
als from the general practice and mental health will be reporting
more their domain specific items. This latter difference may  also
explain the difference between health insurers on the one hand,
32Health Policy 125 (2021) 27–33
nd professionals from the general practice and mental health on
he other hand. Healthcare insurers were most positive about the
ole of managed competition the current Dutch healthcare system.
ealth economists hardly reached any consensus. GP and MH-
are professionals were most dissatisfied and suggested several
hanges or even abolishment of the 2006 reform. Their responses
rovide information concerning the determinants of the dissatis-
action and distrust, and thus which items need to be taken into
ccount in attempts to facilitate or improve the execution of the
urrent system, preferably developed in conjunction with stake-
olders. Our study provides detailed information concerning the
opics that result in lowered satisfaction and trust. These items need
o be taken seriously, not only via increasing transparent informa-
ion, but by developing strategies to minimize the disadvantages
s much where possible, and thus contributing to the already iden-
ified need for improving trust between professionals and health
nsurers [19]. This study offers policymakers and researchers clear
irections for the items to be addressed, and to consider potential
mendments within or to the current system in order to optimize
t in order to achieve and maintain the overall goals of the Dutch
ealthcare system with regard to quality, affordability and acces-
ibility of care.
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